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“If applied econometrics were easy, theorists would do it. (…) Carefully 
applied to coherent causal questions, regression and 2SLS will almost make 
sense. Your standard errors probably won’t be quite right, but they rarely are.” 
 Angrist & Pischke, Mostly Harmless Econometrics (2009) 
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The role of institutions for long-run economic development is widely recognized as important. 
However, we have limited knowledge about how institutional quality systematically influence 
prices in a specific market. This thesis investigates the relationship between a country’s 
institutional quality and day rates in the global offshore supply vessel market. Two hypotheses 
constitutes the starting point for investigating this relationship. One, there are arguments 
suggesting a negative association between institutional quality and costs, i.e. higher costs in 
countries with low quality institutions due to higher operational risk. Two, at the same time 
there are arguments suggesting a positive effect, i.e. higher costs in countries with high 
institutional quality, because these countries in general are more expensive.  
Using proprietary offshore market data, I find that there is a positive correlation between a 
country’s institutional quality score and earned day rates. Furthermore, I investigate through 
what channels this correlation works. I find that institutions influence day rates through the 
positive correlation between institutions and economic development. Because of the presence 
of competition across countries, we would expect costs and prices to become equal across 
countries. However, it seems that prices of offshore services may be higher in richer countries 
due to the substantial presence of non-tradables. Lastly, I follow Acemoglu and Johnson 
(2005) in their unbundling of institutions. By using proxies for property rights institutions and 
contracting institutions, I find that institutional quality matter in the form of property rights 
institutions, and that the latter has no influence on day rates. The thesis also offers qualitative 
discussion of the results. 
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This thesis is the last step to complete my Master of Science in Economics at the Norwegian 
School of Economics (NHH), and my CEMS Master in International Management. 
Throughout my years as student at the Norwegian School of Economics, I have developed an 
interest in offshore-related industries. Both because of its global nature, and also a very hands-
on, operational business. I have worked part-time in an offshore company based in Trondheim, 
and taken shipping-related courses at NHH.  
How a fundamental establishment such as institutions influence countries’ current economic 
situation is fascinating. The offshore energy industry is global, and thus exposed to various 
degrees of institutional quality. Having worked with a company where country-specific rules 
and regulations play an important role for operation and profit, I wanted to investigate whether 
prices in a global business such as the offshore supply vessel industry are influenced by 
differences in the quality of institutions. 
The process of writing this thesis has put to test my analytical skills and at the same time 
improved my understanding of econometrics. The process has been challenging, but a steep 
learning curve also has its benefits.  
I would like to thank my supervisor Torfinn Harding for his time and good answers to all my 
questions throughout the writing process. I also would like to thank BOA Offshore AS in 
Trondheim for access to valuable offshore market and supply vessel data. Furthermore, I 
would like to thank DOF ASA, represented by Chartering Manager Kristian Vea, Charterer 
Anita Olaisen and Crewing Manager Atle Fagerbakke for providing useful information about 
the supply vessel market is practice. Lastly, I would like to thank Henning Mostue from 
Sparebank1 Markets for valuable input to the discussion of the main findings.  
Bergen, June 22 2015 
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Anne Margrethe Vik 
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Norway is a country with long traditions for seagoing trade and industry. With the discovery 
of oil in the 1970’s, new market needs and opportunities were created. From this emerged the 
offshore service sector. In Norway alone, the offshore service and supply industry currently 
consists of more than 1250 companies across the entire value chain: From seismic and drilling 
rig equipment, through valves, nuts and hoses for the shipyard industry, to subsea technology 
and advanced offshore supply and service vessels (Government.no, 2014).  
I got the opportunity to work with one of these companies during the summers of 2013 and 
2014. I quickly understood that this is a sector where market players need to adjust rapidly to 
changing business environments, dependent on where in the world your vessels operate. 
Different rules and regulations from country to country, in addition to the hitches that come 
with operating remotely in countries far away from home constitute a number of challenges 
for shipowners1. On top of this, operators need to take into account changes in the global 
energy market, as the main task of offshore supply is to support offshore oil and gas 
installations. 
The Norwegian Daily, “Dagens Næringsliv”, wrote on Feb 14 2015 about Norwegian 
shipowners’ struggles in Brazil. There, every fourth offshore service vessel belongs to a 
Norwegian shipowner (Langved, Segrov, & Ånestad, 2015). The Brazilian state-owned energy 
company and monopolist Petrobras’ unpredictable behavior and corruption scandals, 
accompanied by slow bureaucratic processes, makes life hard for participants in the offshore 
service market. Do factors like these, as caused by differences in institutional quality, have 
significant impact on offshore market prices over time? 
The political procedures and enforcement of rules depend on a country’s institutional 
framework. Institutional quality is a much-discussed topic in the field of Economics. Focus 
often is on the role of institutions in economic growth and development. There is broad 
                                                 
1 I consequently use “shipowner” instead of “ship owner” to improve readability.  
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consensus that good institutions form a necessary foundation for long-term economic growth. 
Economic institutions determine the constraints on and the incentives to investment, which 
again shape economic outcomes (Acemoglu et al., 2005).  
The offshore service sector is global of nature, being part of the upstream oil and gas logistics 
chain. The location of Planet Earth’s oil and gas reservoirs was established before the term 
“institutions” was introduced. The more or less random distribution of oil and gas activity 
around the world results in the offshore service sector being subject to a diversified selection 
of legislatures.  
No study has so far attempted to look at the connection between offshore market day rates and 
institutional quality. My current perception is that studies are concerned with identifying short-
term factors that affect market activity, and thus overlook long-term, country-specific 
fundamentals such as institutions.  The offshore supply vessel market is a market in constant 
development, where analysts seem more interested in looking into the crystal ball than 
analyzing cost drivers by looking at historical data. As a global industry that operates in 
countries in both ends of the institutional quality range, it is interesting to see if differences 
between countries play a significant part in cost levels.  
This thesis aims to find whether a relationship exists between a country’s institutional quality 
and day rates in the offshore supply vessel market for the vessels operating under the 
legislature of the country in question. I approach the problem by building a model where 
identifying this relationship is in focus. The model is not supposed to be predictive. 
Furthermore, I take a closer look at which channels institutional quality may influence day 
rates through, by using proxies for a country’s wealth, property rights institutions and 
contracting institutions. I use limited-access offshore market data in my research, combined 
with data from various other established data sources. The study also offers a qualitative 
discussion of the results.  
Two alternative hypotheses emerged when I first started looking into the topic of day rates. 
One, consider a country with low quality institutions. Would the shipowners require a risk 
premium when operating in these countries, and would this together with other factors such as 
difficult logistics and slow communication result in a negative correlation between day rates 
and institutional quality? Two, are countries with good institutions richer, and would the 
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general higher real price levels in these countries this lead to a positive correlation? With that 
in mind, the following question represents the baseline issue that I will answer empirically: 
Does a country’s institutional quality score matter for day rates in the platform supply vessel 
market? 
Access to high quality market data inspired me to take a closer look at how institutional quality 
systematically influence prices in a global, competitive market.  
 
In this section, I will describe previous research made on the subject and related subjects. This 
puts the thesis into perspective, and describes how my research might add new information to 
existing literature. 
For the topic of institutional quality, there is a vast amount of research made on the subject. A 
regular approach is whether institutions influence countries’ economic performance, and in 
which direction the causality points. Several research papers have sought to answer the 
question of how institutions in. By exploiting differences in European mortality rates as an 
instrument for current institutions, Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson (2000) estimate large 
effects of institutions on income per capita. There is broad consensus that quality of institutions 
is a fundamental determinant for economic development. In the article “Institutions as 
fundamental cause of long-run growth”, Acemoglu et al. (2005) highlight this issue. They find 
that factors such as constraints on and incentives for investments, shaped by economic 
institutions, are fundamental for economic outcome.  
A much-cited definition of institutions is that “institutions are the rules of the game in a 
society” (North, 1990). The growing consensus among economists and political scientists is 
that the institutions of a society, i.e. a society’s social, legal and political organization is 
important for economic performance (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005).    
Different types of institutions have unequal effects on economic performance. Acemoglu & 
Johnson (2005) evaluates the importance of “property rights institutions”, which protect 
citizens against expropriation by the government and powerful elites, and “contracting 
institutions”, which enable private contracts between citizens. In the article, the authors find 
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that “property rights institutions have first-order effects on long-run economic growth, 
investment, and financial development” when using average expropriation risk as proxy. On 
the other hand, contracting institutions appear to matter only for the form of “financial 
intermediation”. 
There are arguments suggesting both a positive and negative relationship between institutional 
quality and costs. Below, I will discuss these arguments as they appear in literature. 
Bohn & Deacon (2000) take a closer look at the effect of property rights and extraction of 
natural resources. They seek to answer the question of how important, quantitatively, weak 
property rights are the use of natural resources. They find that greater ownership risk can lead 
to slower exploitation of some resources2. Oil exploration is an example of this. Because it 
requires heavy upfront investments, investors are not willing to take the risk if property rights 
are weak. Their study offers a link to the effect of property rights on other capital intensive 
industries. It also suggests that costs are higher in countries with low institutional quality, 
which points in the direction of a negative relationship between institutional quality and day 
rates in the supply vessel market. Day rates would be higher, reflecting an incorporated risk 
premium.  
The quality of institutions have direct influence on company-level decision-making as well. 
Institutional quality does matter to energy companies when deciding where to drill for oil and 
gas. When opportunities are divided by national borders, investors choose to drill on the side 
with better institutional quality two out of three times (Harding & Cust, 2014). This too points 
in the direction higher day rates in countries with low quality institutions.   
Speculatively, operating costs may be higher in countries with low institutional quality 
because this implies “bad environment”, e.g. lack of infrastructure, communication issues and 
other things. 
A recently published master thesis from the Norwegian School of Economics makes a 
qualitative comparison of the Brazilian and Norwegian offshore supply vessel markets, and 
concludes that both operating and capital expenditure are substantially higher in Brazil than in 
                                                 
2 Their findings are ambiguous, i.e. the effect of property rights is dependent on type of natural resource. 
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Norway. Again, their findings speaks in favor of higher costs in countries with lower 
institutional quality. Higher crew costs and the Brazilian state-owned company Petrobras 
being a challenging client are identified as main drivers of higher operating costs (Vikenes & 
Johannessen, 2014). Wage levels as drivers for operating costs is something I will use when I 
investigate further what channels institutional quality influence offshore market rates3.  
On the other hand, there are arguments for a positive effect between quality of institutions and 
costs. Another recently published master thesis investigate which factors influence day rates 
in the Northwest Europe offshore rig market. The rig market is closely related to the offshore 
supply vessel market. Operating in Norwegian waters requires a special license. They 
conclude that rigs that are approved for operating in Norwegian waters obtain a day rate 
premium of 30% (Nygård & Simonsen, 2014). This indicates that high quality institutions 
drive costs upwards. I will use the same source of offshore market data. However, for reasons 
explained later, I structure the data differently and use different econometric techniques.  
Institutional quality is often associated with level of democracy. Acemoglu et al. (2005) 
investigates the relationship between income and democracy. They find that the effect of 
income on democracy is not causal, but that among other things, the positive correlation 
between income and democracy is due to historical events that affect the economic and 
political “development path” of a society. This leads to persistent influences on economic and 
political outcomes. In other words, historical events that lead to the development of democratic 
institutions, which again is a foundation for economic development. 
How to measure democracy is not straightforward. One of the most famous measures is 
Freedom House’s “Freedom of the World” index, where each country’s score is based on two 
numerical ratings for political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House, 2015). The Polity IV 
project provides another measure, widely used in academic research (The Polity Project, 
2015). The World Bank’s World Development Indicators is another well-known resource for 
institutional quality research.  
                                                 
3 The two conclusions might seem contradictory. One thesis states that Norway is the more expensive country due to special 
local requirements, while the other points to Brazil being more expensive for what seems like similar reasons. However, the 
first looks at rig market rates compared to the rest of the Northwest Europe region, while the other only compares Brazil to 
Norway. A comparison of rig rates between Brazil and Norway would have given a more comparable conclusion in this sense.  
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Overall, institutions are proved to have importance for a country's economic development. 
Good property rights institutions creates incentives to invest, and defines economic growth 
trajectories. A consequence of the energy sector being global, the exploration and extraction 
of oil is subject to various legislatures and policies. The quality of institutions is empirically 
proved to matter for where market players choose to drill for oil, and to what extent investors 
choose to invest in oil exploration. However, no one has so far investigated the relationship 
between institutional quality and day rates in the offshore supply vessel market, which is 
closely related to the oil industry.  
What makes this segment of the offshore industry interesting is that vessels follow the oil 
industry all around the world. Thus, operations are exposed to very different environments of 
institutions. Additionally, the presence of global competition would lead us to expect that 
prices and costs become similar across countries, or alternatively differ to the extent of input 
being non-tradable. This makes the offshore supply vessel industry very interesting for 
analyzing differences in costs.  
Despite the fact that the offshore supply industry is subject to different rules and regulations 
dependent on what country the operations take place, the issue has not been empirically tested. 
This thesis examines whether the quality institutions influence prices in a specific, competitive 
and global industry, by using offshore market data across the period 1995-2013.  
 
In section 1, I describe the overall motivation behind the research question. The section 
contains information about background and literature, and puts the thesis in the context of 
current economics. Section 2 is a description of the offshore supply vessel market. The section 
gives the reader a necessary overview of the global market, and a foundation for understanding 
how the concept of day rates and related cost drivers. Research methodology and applied 
econometric techniques are explained in section 3. A description of data sources and pre-
analysis data treatment is found in section 4. In section 5, the baseline results are presented 
and discussed. Section 6 is an extension of section 5, and further investigates the reasons 
behind the baseline results. Lastly, section 7 provides a conclusion, together with a discussion 
of limitations and suggestions for further research.  
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In this section, I will describe the global supply vessel market, and discuss topics such as 
vessel properties, operational procedures and cost drivers. The purpose is to help the reader to 
put the main findings in context, by describing the reality backdrop of this thesis. 
 
 
There are two main categories of supply vessels, namely the Platform Supply Vessel (PSV) 
and the Anchor Handling Tug Supply (AHTS) vessel4. The abbreviation OSV – Offshore 
Supply Vessel – is commonly used as designation for all types of supply vessels, where PSV 
and AHTS are the two biggest categories. Where the PSVs’ main task is supply of different 
sorts of equipment to and from offshore installations, the AHTS is a specially designed vessel 
for anchor handling and towing offshore platforms, barges and production modules/vessels 
(Farstad, 2012). PSVs are less specialized and a more generic type of vessel compared to the 
AHTS. Overall, running a PSV is cheaper than its more complex sister, the AHTS (Vea, 2015).  
I limit the scope of offshore supply vessels to PSVs only. In the specified model, I seek to 
compare as equal vessels as possible by eliminating time-invariant individual properties. This 
is best done with the use of econometric techniques, and will be further explained later. 
A PSV is often categorized by its deadweight tonnage (DWT), which describes how much the 
vessel can safely carry. The categories used are 1,000-1,999 DWT, 2,000-2,999 DWT, 3,000-
3,999 DWT and 4,000+ DWT. Other PSV specifications are clear deck area (300 – 1200 m2) 
and sophistication of dynamic positioning system5.  
Each vessel receives a unique number upon launching, referred to as the IMO number. This 
number is made of the three letters “IMO” followed by a seven-digit number assigned to all 
                                                 
4 I will use all “boat”, “ship” and “vessel” as words for describing the object of interest, namely the platform supply vessel. 
“Shipowner” refers to an owner of such vessels, i.e. the receiver of the day rate. A “charterer” is the company who hires the 
vessel. 
5 Dynamic position system (DP) is a computer controlled system that automatically maintain a ship's position.  
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individual ships by IHS Maritime. This number is never changed, independent of changes to 
the ship such as flag or reconstruction (IHS Global Limited, 2015). 
 
OSVs take part in all phases of oil and gas field exploration and production, and is a key part 
of the “upstream logistics” chain. The market for offshore supply vessels (OSV) is closely 
related to activity in the oil sector around the world. Higher activity in the oil and gas sector 
implies higher demand for offshore supply services. Oil companies hire supply vessels 
dependent on field operational needs. These vary greatly – long-term production assistance 
require long-term dedication, while drilling support require only short-term assistance.  
There are two types of contracts, namely spot and term. Spot contracts can last from 1 day up 
to 29 days, while term contracts are everything from 30 days and above and can last for years 
(Ådland, 2013).  
The supply curve is relatively inelastic in the short term. It usually takes 2-3 years to build a 
vessel. The demand curve is also quite inelastic, as the oil companies depend on getting 
supplies to their platforms. To keep the production running, the rig owners are completely 
dependent on deliveries of equipment, personnel and so on.  
On the other hand, shipowners are willing to accept very low rates to avoid their ship being 
laid up. The shipowners’ options are “warm-stacking” – parking the vessels but keeping them 
crewed for rapid return to the market – and “cold-stacking,” in which they virtually shut the 
vessels down and send the crews home. Docking still needs to be paid for and loans needs to 
be repaid, in other words, this is in many cases not a favorable option for shipowners. 
Market demand is correlated with the price of oil, which can be very volatile. Effectively, the 
spot day rates are volatile. Day rates can go from being very low in times of excess capacity, 
to extremely high when term utilization rate is 100%. Term utilization is the number of vessels 
on work in a region over the total number of vessels available. Spot contracts usually lasts 
between 10-14 days and are fixed only days before execution. However, average spot rates 
should outweigh the occasional risk of vessel unemployment. Long-term contracts is a way to 
mitigate the risk of a vessel being laid up in times of excess market capacity and low rates. 
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The offshore supply market is pro-cyclical; in good times, the building activity will be high 
and the shipyards’ order books full. This easily leads to overcapacity if the number of ordered 
vessels is higher than market demand.  
During the last decade, deep-water activity has become increasingly important. Technology 
advancement are making OSVs ever more fit for harsh conditions, as production move towards 
new areas when the conventional fields are depleted. A country’s offshore geology decides 
whether there is deep-water activity in the region or not, and some regions have higher 
occurrence of these conditions than others.   
During the last couple of years, the demand for vessels over 3,000 DWT have increased. As 
of March 4 2015, 276 new PSV are under construction on a global basis. 233 of these are over 
3,000 DWT. This is due to the increased activity in deep-water drilling around the world, for 
which bigger supply vessels are needed. Exploration and drilling activity in regions further 
north is also a driving factor in this development, because harsh conditions requires more 
advanced equipment and bigger capacity.   
Details about each country’s offshore basins, i.e. whether it is deep-water or not, is not easily 
accessed data. However, the model control for geography in general by including the latitude 
of a country’s capital.  
 
The main offshore markets are the regions of Northwest Europe, South America (Brazil), West 
Africa, the Gulf of Mexico and the Indian Pacific. The South Pacific (Australia) also counts 
as one of the bigger markets. In year 2000, 56% of the supply vessel fleet (both AHTS and 
PSV) was associated with the activity in Northwest Europe (Farstad, 2012). The region is still 
one of the most important markets, but growth has stagnated in recent years. The activity in 
Northwest Europe is with few exceptions executed on Norwegian or United Kingdom 
continental shelf. Activity on the UK shelf is more in recess compared to the Norwegian shelf, 
where there are still good exploration activity. The activity is moving northwards to the 
Barents Sea. Northwest Europe is the only region with a well-functioning spot market.   
The Gulf of Mexico is the place of origin for offshore production. The region has seen a steep 
increase in deep-water activity. Offshore production in the US is divided in four regions: Gulf 
of Mexico, Pacific, Alaska and the Atlantic region.  
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Brazil is an important driver of activity in South America. New technology for oil exploration 
in ultra-deep-water areas has been an important driver for Brazil's growth and important 
position in the global market.   
Offshore West Africa is also a deep-water area. Nigeria is the largest regional offshore 
producer in West Africa. The region sees an increase in demand for larger vessels as deep-
water activity grows. Angola is the second-largest producer, and Equatorial Guinea is third. 
This is considered a difficult market due to complicated tax and visa regulations. 
The regions vary in terms of remoteness of shore base, regulatory regimes and geographical 
conditions, such as weather conditions and benign or moderate waters.     
 
The contract between the owner of a vessel and the charterer for the hire of a vessel is called 
the charter party. The charterer is the company that enters into a contract with the owner to 
hire a vessel. The charterer is usually a major international or state owned oil company, smaller 
oil companies, large offshore contractors and logistics companies.   
The key contract features are date of delivery, port of delivery back to the owner, period of 
hire, and mobilization/demobilization fee. The period of hire can be a fixed number of days, 
or the time required to finish the operation. The charterer and the shipowner can agree on 
options for charterer to extend contract duration. Mob/demobilization fee is a lump-sum 
payment from the charterer to the shipowner to compensate for relocating the vessel long 
distances (Ådland, 2013). In some cases, duration of the contract may cause the shipowner to 
waive the demobilization fee (Jurcevic, Bosic, & Skoko, 2013).  
The cost structure consists of fixed costs, mainly capital costs, and variable costs, under which 
you find maintenance cost, operating cost (OPEX), voyage costs depending on type of trade 
or operation, and cargo handling costs. Crew cost and fuel are the most considerable 
operational costs (Strandenes, 2013). Charterer pays the daily rate of hire to the shipowner, 
and is in addition responsible for port costs and fuel while chartered. Thus, the charterer is the 
one exposed to risk in case of hike in oil prices. Ship fuel is called bunker. The shipowner 
pays lubricant oil and other operating costs such as crew costs and insurance.  
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Crew costs represent about 60% share of the total daily operating expenditure (Vea, 2015)6. 
The crew size is usually around 14-15 people. The crew size does not increase proportionally 
with vessel size once one gets above very low tonnage.  The maritime labor market has become 
increasingly global during the last decades, and globalization has caused crew costs to become 
more similar for vessel operators irrespective of the nationality of the ship-owning company. 
The crew cost varies between countries, depending on the local requirements. Some countries 
have developed stringent regulations with the purpose of protecting and helping the country’s 
own economy and labor market.  
Brazil is an example of this. Creation of a sustainable environment for Brazil's long-term 
industry and protecting its workforce are fundamental to its government's energy policy. 
According to sources in the Norwegian offshore supply vessel operator DOF ASA, who count 
Brazil among their most important markets, operating in Brazil today comes with a portion of 
tedious bureaucracy, taxes and fees. Getting working visas for foreign workers is one of the 
complicating issues.  
Another thing is the requirements for use of local workforce. An international crew is 
gradually replaced with Brazilians, and after 360 days, the crew must consist of 67 % local 
workforce7. Further complicating the compliance with tough requirements for local content is 
a profound lack of skilled workforce. The activity offshore Brazil has increased rapidly the 
last decade, but Brazil has not managed to educate enough officers for the offshore sector. In 
some cases, this situation has forced Norwegian operators to double-up a vessels crew with 
Norwegian officers to compensate for the lack of local competence. Paying double salaries 
does for obvious reasons make operations more expensive. Argentina has also implemented 
similar rules.  
Another country that is known for its tough requirements for local content and high wage level 
is Australia. A strong industry labor union has succeeded in pushing wages to levels above the 
country average.  
                                                 
6 This is seen from a shipowner’s view, when the charterer covers bunker cost (fuel). 
7 Formally, this is referred to as rule RN72.  
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Countries in West Africa, an increasingly important region for oil exploration and drilling, 
have not yet developed an equally strict framework of rules and requirements, but here the 
shipowners run into other difficulties. Slow bureaucratic processes, underdeveloped 
infrastructure, general security issues and difficulties with money transactions are a few of 
them (Vea, 2015).  
Capital expenditure is the other main cost component. The price of a “newbuild” – the industry 
term – depends on size and qualifications. There are also regional differences in build costs, 
among other things due to variations in wage level. However, communication difficulties and 
cultural differences may cause delays in delivery and thus generate extra costs. The decision 
of where to build a ship also depends on where the vessel is situated to operate. Some countries 
require the ship to be built locally to be granted certain operational rights.  
Different vessels are needed in different regions dependent on conditions and type of work. In 
the North Sea, there is demand for bigger and newer vessels designed for harsh conditions. 
Bad weather, seasons, temperature and deep-water drilling requires well-equipped, big 
vessels. In comparison, vessels in for instance Southeast Asia do not face the same harsh 
conditions, and are usually older and smaller.  
I control for time-invariant vessel properties such as size and equipment when analyzing the 
data. The method and implications with this will be further explained in the following sections. 
 
The offshore market is regulated, and there are a number of both international and national 
rules and regulations. Requirements to “local content”, or cabotage, vary between countries. 
The principle of cabotage refers to a country being entitled to prohibit foreign-flagged vessels 
from transporting and/or operating between ports in its territory (Ådland, 2013).  
All vessels are required to register under a flag in order to sail in international waters.  Different 
rules apply for different flags, according to the registration requirements of the flag nation. 
Registration confers nationality on a ship and brings it within the jurisdiction of the law of the 
flag state. The registration allows the ship to travel internationally wherever the citizens of 
that nation is allowed to travel and works somehow like a ship’s passport. Some flags are 
known as “flags of convenience”, and describe ships that are registered in open registries. 
Open registries allow companies to register their ship independent of nationality, while 
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“traditional” or “national” registries only allow for registration of vessels owned by residents 
or companies of that country (Brudevoll, 2013). The purpose of sailing under a flag of 
convenience is to avoid rules and regulations of the nation of origin. Costs and benefits have 
to be considered when choosing where to register a vessel.  
The American offshore giant Tidewater explains in their annual report how national and 
international rules affect the firm’s operations. The laws of the United States require that 
vessels engaged in U.S. coastwise trade must be built in the U.S. and registered under U.S. 
flag. Once a vessel built in the U.S. is registered under foreign flag, it cannot thereafter engage 
in trade along the U.S. coast. In other words, sailing from port to port along the U.S. coast is 
forbidden. Of Tidewater’s total 328 vessels as of March 2013, only 42 vessels were registered 
under U.S. flag (Tidewater Inc., 2013).  
Another example national regulation is Norway. Norway offers two types of flags, NOR and 
NIS. NIS is an abbreviation for Norwegian International Ship Register. Vessels sailing under 
a NIS flag are subject to Norwegian jurisdiction, but not allowed to carry cargo or passengers 
between Norwegian ports (cabotage). The NIS flag and accompanying rules were established 
in 1987, with the purpose of improving Norwegian-owned vessels’ competitiveness abroad, 
protecting Norwegian workforce and ensure the registration of Norwegian vessels under the 
Norwegian flag (Sjøfartsdirektoratet (Norwegian Maritime Authority), 2014).  
Even though rules protecting national waters might lower competition, the same local rules 
constitute a potential source of higher operational cost. For instance, mandatory use of local 
workforce in high-cost countries will result in increased day rates as crew cost increase.  
I will treat the concept of flags as an example of industry regulations. Controlling for which 
flag the vessel flies is not done explicitly in the specified model, but indirectly through 
controlling for individual vessel characteristics that do not change across time. Moreover, if 
flags indeed represent an unobserved determinant of day rates, these unobserved factors 
related to country are thoroughly dealt with. See section 3.5.2 “Clustering of standard errors”.  
Overall, the supply vessel market is global, and subject to a wide range of different rules and 
regulations. The market is unique in the sense that a vessel can change between countries, and 
thus the same individuals are exposed to different level of institutional quality dependent on 
where in the world the operation is to take place.  
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This section will describe the applied econometric techniques. The data set used in this thesis 
has a panel structure. First, I will briefly introduce the conditions for unbiased and consistent 
OLS estimates, and argue why these conditions no not hold for my data. Second, I will explain 
the concept of fixed-effects estimation, and what problems I solve with this approach. Lastly, 
I introduce the concept of instrumental variables, and explain in what way I use it. The theory 
presented is based on Wooldrigde (2013) and Angrist & Pischke (2009) if nothing else cited. 
 
For the ordinary least squares (OLS) method, there follows five assumptions under which the 
OLS estimators are unbiased and consistent. These are known as the Gauss-Markov theorem. 
I will concentrate on two of these assumptions, namely the zero conditional mean assumption 
and the homoscedasticity assumption.  
 Zero conditional mean: The expected value of the error 𝑢 is zero given any of the 
explanatory variables, 𝐸(𝑢|𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑘) = 0.  
 Homoscedasticity: The variance in the error term is constant, i.e. the error term has the 
same variance given any values of the explanatory variables. This assumption is known 
as the homoscedasticity assumption: 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢|𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑘) = 𝜎
2.  
The assumption of zero conditional mean is not likely to hold if the model is not specified 
correctly, or if an important determinant of the regressand is omitted. A violation of this 
assumption will lead to biased OLS estimates, and invalidate statistical inference.  
That data has a panel structure is common in empirical research. Panel data is a data set 
constructed from repeated cross sections over time. It consists of both a cross-sectional and a 
time series dimension. The panel data set used in this thesis has a three-dimensional structure, 
with 𝑖 individuals in 𝑗 groups over time 𝑡. 
The panel data error term is usually written as a composite error, consisting of an individual 
time-constant, unobserved error term and an idiosyncratic error term: 
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𝑣𝑖𝑗 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Panel data techniques are based on the particular structure of the error term, and how to treat 
the time-constant effect 𝑎𝑖.  
Balanced panel data have an equal number of observations for each individual in every period. 
If this is not the case, the data set is unbalanced. Modern statistical software like Stata is 
capable of dealing with unbalanced panels. 
Unbiased and consistent estimates are the key to correct econometric inference. An estimator 
whose expected value, i.e. the mean of its sampling distribution, equals the population value 
is unbiased. A consistent estimator is one whose distributions of estimates become more and 
more concentrated near the true value of the parameter being estimated, i.e. the estimated 
parameter gets closer to the population parameter as the sample size increases.    
As explained above, the error term in panel data is composite. So, if the zero conditional mean 
assumption is to hold, the explanatory variables 𝑥𝑖𝑡 have to be uncorrelated with both 𝑎𝑖 and 
𝑢𝑖𝑡. If we think that one or more of the explanatory variables are correlated with 𝑎𝑖, the OLS 
will be biased. This is best known as omitted variable bias (sometimes also referred to as 
heterogeneity bias).   
Omitted variables can cause a positive or a negative bias. Establishing the direction of the bias 
is fairly easy in a simple regression model with only one explanatory variable, but more 
difficult when dealing with multiple regressors. Correlation between a single variable and the 
error term causes bias in all the OLS estimators (Wooldrigde, 2013, s. 96). In most cases, it is 
impossible to control for all sources of variation in a model. 
Fortunately, methods have been developed to deal with such issues in panel data. 
 
Fixed-effects estimation, sometimes referred to as the use of time-demeaned explanatory 
variables, is a way to eliminate the effects of fixed differences between individuals on 
outcome. This is a widely used method when working with panel data.  
 25 
The key to fixed effects estimation is that the unobserved individual effects on outcome 
appears without a time subscript in the linear equation. It is assumed that the outcome 𝑦 is 
dependent on unobserved individual fixed effects, and time-varying explanatory variables, 
here represented by 𝑥𝑖𝑡. The following general equation represents a fixed effects model in the 
case of one explanatory variable: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Here, 𝛼𝑖 is the individual fixed effect and 𝜆𝑡 is a year effect. The causal effect of interest is the 
coefficient 𝛽1. This effect can be estimated by treating 𝛼𝑖 as a parameter to be estimated. The 
same is the case for the year effect. The unobserved individual effects are coefficients on 
dummies for each individual, while the year effects are coefficient on time dummies. In large 
data sets, the solution is not to include dummies for all of the individuals. Subtracting the 
individual averages and estimate the deviation from mean gives the same estimated result.  
The first step is to calculate the individual averages: 
?̅?𝑖 = ?̅?0 + 𝛽1?̅?𝑖 + ?̅? + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀?̅? 
Subtracting the mean from the fixed effect equation gives 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1(𝑥𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖) + (𝜆𝑡 − ?̅?) + (𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀?̅?) 
The time-constant unobserved individual effects disappear in this last equation, because they 
are constant over time (and so is their mean value). However, statistical software does report 
it. The intercept now interprets as the average effect of all individual unobserved effects on 
outcome. This has no practical significance. 
Statistical software packages like Stata routinely compute fixed-effect estimates.  
 
Above, the practical way to control for the “year-effect” is to include time-dummies in the 
model. Dummy variables for each year isolate certain periods that may be systematically 
different from other periods covered by a data set. Panel data observations are spread across 
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time. In brief, including one dummy variable for each year allows the intercept to differ across 
periods.  
This method is widely used in panel data analysis. The omitted year represents the reference 
year. The dummy variable coefficient interpretation is, when controlling for other factors, how 
the dependent variable is affected in this year compared to the reference year.     
 
Even though fixed-effects estimation is sometimes a good method for removing unobserved 
individual effects that do not vary across time, there might still be cases where the error term 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 is correlated with one or more of the explanatory variables. Instrumental variables are 
useful tools when there is suspicion that one of the explanatory variables in a model might be 
endogenous, that is, correlated with the error term. This is the conventional way of using the 
IV method. I will use it for a slightly different purpose. My main focus does not lie on isolating 
a causal effect, but to see whether the instrumented variable might help explain the effect of 
the instrument. This will be further explained in section 6.    
 
Regular OLS regression may fail to produce convincing estimates of causal effects. The 
instrumental variables (IV) method is a way to deal with this issue. The IV method solves the 
statistical simultaneous equations problem by using variables that appear in one equation to 
shift this equation and trace out the other (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). Isolating causal effects 
is not the main point in my use of IV, but serves as good framework for explaining the method. 
In econometrics, instrumental variables (IV) and the two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) method 
is often referred to interchangeably. Instrumental variables leaves the unobserved variable in 
the error term, but in contrast to regular OLS estimation, it recognizes the presence of the 
omitted variable. The parameters for calculating the 2SLS estimate is best understood as 
regression coefficients.  
The model that contains the variable of interest, which is suspected of being endogenous, is 
called the structural equation. To isolate the causal relationship, I have an instrumental variable 
𝑧𝑖 that I assume is uncorrelated with the error term, but correlated with the endogenous 
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explanatory variable. The link from the instrument 𝑧𝑖  to the causal variable of interest 𝑥𝑖 is 
called the first-stage equation. The Greek letter 𝜑 represents this link: 
𝑥𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝜑𝑧𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖1 + 𝑣 
The direct effect from the instrument on outcome is called the reduced form. This effect is 
described with the letter 𝜌: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝜋0 + 𝜌𝑧𝑖 + 𝜋1𝑥𝑖1 + 𝑢 
The causal effect of interest then is determined by the ratio of reduced form on the first stage. 
Lambda is the chosen letter to represent this ratio, which can be written as a covariance’s ratio 
called the IV formula: 
λ =
𝜌
𝜑
=
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦𝑖, 𝑧𝑖)
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖)
 
Computing the ratio λ  can be done in two stages. After running the first-stage equation, the 
fitted values, ?̂?𝑖 are predicted. In the second stage, the outcome 𝑦𝑖 is regressed on the fitted 
values. Here, λ is the coefficient of the fitted values. Statistical software packages generates 
this ratio in one operation, which limits the scope of mistakes and produce appropriate standard 
errors. Doing these two stages by running each regression for itself does not produce the 
correct standard errors needed to measure sampling variance, and test statistics would be 
invalid. Including additional control variables comes with no extra cost, provided they appear 
in all stages.  
A good instrumental variable must fulfill two conditions. First, it must be exogenous. That is, 
the covariance between the instrument 𝑧𝑖 and the error term in the structural equation must 
equal zero. This is the same as stating that 𝑧𝑖 is uncorrelated with any other determinants of 
the dependent variable. This is referred to as the exclusion restriction. In other words, the 
instrument is exogenous if the instrumented variable is the only channel through which the 
instrument affects the dependent variable. The exclusion restriction is not possible to test, 
because the error term is unobserved, and reasoning is the only way to decide whether it holds.  
Second, the instrument must be relevant. Relevance is determined by the covariance between 
the instrument and the original explanatory variable that is suspected of being endogenous. 
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For an instrument to be relevant, the relationship between the instrument and the instrumented 
causal effect cannot be zero, formally written as 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑖, 𝑧𝑖) ≠ 0. If there is no observable 
effect of 𝑧𝑖 on 𝑥𝑖, the chosen instrument is not relevant. Therefore, if the estimates produced 
in the first stage are only marginally significantly different from zero, the IV estimates are 
unlikely to be very informative (Angrist & Pischke, 2009).  
Whether the exclusion restriction holds or not will not be the main issue when I later use the 
2SLS method. I will use instrument variables with the objective of investigating whether a set 
of chosen channels are relevant, and not necessarily establish a causal relationship. In other 
words, the 2SLS estimate is not of great importance, but the first-stage equation is. This 
diverges from the conventional way of using IV.  
 
 
Heterogeneity in standard errors is rather the rule than the exception. Heterogeneity occurs 
when the variance of the error term is not constant given each of the explanatory variables, as 
follows from assumption 5 above. To deal with this issue, it is possible to use the option of 
heterogeneity-robust standard errors when running regressions. The 𝑡 statistics will get smaller 
when using robust standard errors, and the confidence intervals wider8.  
Testing for heterogeneity is possible, but not always necessary. Economic theory rarely gives 
any reason to believe that the errors are homoscedastic. It therefore is prudent to assume that 
the errors might be heteroskedastic. Nothing is lost if I use heteroskedastic-robust standard 
errors in the case where the standard errors are completely homoscedastic. The safest choice 
is to opt for heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors if I do not have compelling reasons to 
believe that my standard errors are homoscedastic, which I do not.   
                                                 
8 The t-statistic formula: 𝑡 =
?̂?𝑗
𝑠𝑒(?̂?𝑗)
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Dealing with standard errors in three-dimensional panel data is challenging. The Fixed-Effects 
estimation method removes time-constant individual effects, 𝑎𝑖, but there might also be time-
constant effects related to country in this case that is not controlled for through FE estimation.  
Traditional cross-section inference relies on the basic assumption that all observations are 
independent, i.e. treated as a random draw in each cross-section. Homoscedasticity means that 
the errors in a regression model have constant variance conditional on the explanatory 
variables (Wooldrigde, 2013). This is the same as assuming no serial- or autocorrelation in the 
error term. This assumption is rather unrealistic. In data with a group structure, for instance 
where each country represents a group in which individuals are observed, there is reason to 
believe that the vessels share some kind of common exposure from the country that affect the 
obtained day rates. By overlooking the so-called intraclass-covariance, we tend to 
underestimate standard errors. The standard errors are subject to what have been named 
Moulton bias (Moulton, 1986).  
As a rule of thumb, standard errors, confidence intervals and test statistics that are valid in a 
large set of cross-sections should be calculated under the weakest assumptions (Wooldrigde, 
2013, s. 691). Clustering standard errors is a common way to deal with serial correlation in 
the idiosyncratic errors. In FE estimation, clustering is applied to the time-demeaned equation. 
However, clustering standard errors does not always offer a straightforward solution. In cases 
where panels are non-nested within clusters, the clustering process is somewhat complicated. 
Non-nested panels means that the group effect is not constant on individuals, because 
individuals move across groups. Clustering standard errors on individual-level will not 
improve inference much, because the effect of this is the same as using heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors. 
For example, a data set where firms represent the panel identity and municipal the group 
identity, the group effect from the individual municipality will be constant on the firms at least 
in the short to medium run. However, if individuals move across groups, the effect is not 
constant. Clustering standard errors on group-level only is therefore not feasible, because the 
group effect on individuals vary dependent in what group the individual currently is present.  
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A possible solution to this problem is two-way clustering, where standard errors are clustered 
on both individual and group level. The intraclass covariance, which is the possible source of 
the country effects that will underestimate standard errors, is now taken into account.  
 
Heterogeneity, caused by omitted variables, will cause biased estimates and invalid test 
statistics. Robustness tests of the model is a way to discover how the relationship of interest 
changes in response to excluded or added explanatory variables. A way to think of this is how 
the estimated coefficient reacts when factors are “taken out” of the error term. If the variable 
is “left” in the error term, this will cause estimates to be biased, because the variable is relevant 
determinant of the dependent variable.  If the output changes drastically when an independent 
variable is added or excluded, this gives reason for further discussion about the independent 
variables’ importance for disclosing the relationship of interest.  
I will perform robustness checks and discuss the output in section 5 “Baseline results”. The 
FE approach in itself is a way to deal with biased estimates, because this eliminates time-
invariant individual effects from the error term. I will not formally test for heteroskedasticity, 
but I argue that it is almost certainly present due to group effects. By clustering standard errors 
on both individual and group level and see if this have implications for the significance of the 
results, I control for both potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error terms.  
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Offshore market data are collected from ODS-Petrodata's MarineBase. MarineBase covers 
detailed vessel data on all the major offshore markets. Founded in 2002, ODS-Petrodata is an 
impartial provider of energy information covering rigs, offshore field construction and marine 
support vessels. The company brings together more than 35 years of offshore data built on the 
legacies of its predecessor companies. ODS-Petrodata was in 2011 acquired by IHS. IHS is a 
global data giant provide extensive services in the business of market intelligence used by both 
private companies and governments in decision-making processes (IHS.com, 2015).  
From this database, I get information on fixture dates, start date and end date of each contract, 
chosen vessel characteristics and most importantly day rates. All day rates are “earned” day 
rates, i.e. the rates that have actually been paid for a vessel. The data contains PSVs in all 
sizes. In addition, all of the vessels do have a dynamic positioning system.   
As measure for institutional quality, I use the Polity IV data series9. This is a widely used 
measure in academic research. The composite Polity score is calculated as the difference 
between a country’s democracy and autocracy score. The "Polity score" captures this regime 
authority spectrum on a 21-pont scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 
(consolidated democracy). So-called “interregnums”, “interruptions” and “transition” state of 
governments are given the values -77, -66 and -88 (The Polity Project, 2015). I treat these as 
missing values.    
The use of instrumental variables is inspired by (Acemoglu & Johnson, Unbundling 
Institutions, 2005). In their article “Unbundling Institutions”, they aim to discover what type 
of institutions have most effect on a country’s economic development. The two categories 
used for institutions are property rights institutions and contracting institutions. As a proxy 
for property rights institutions, they use the average protection against government 
expropriation risk in a country as assessed by the international agency Political Risk Services. 
                                                 
9Data available from http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html  
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Political Risk Services reports a value between 0 and 10 for each country and year, with zero 
indicating the lowest protection against expropriation.  
For contracting institutions, they use the legal formalism as developed and used by Djankov, 
Rafael, Florencio, & Andrei (2002) and Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer 
(2003). The legal formalism index measures substantive and procedural statutory intervention 
in judicial cases at lower-level civil trial courts. A greater degree of legal formalism creates 
additional costs for enforcing private contracts. Djankov et al. (2003) measure the extent of 
these costs by surveying expert opinions of lawyers in an international network of law firms 
in 109 countries. They then construct an index of legal formalism that is comparable across 
countries. The index ranges from zero to seven, where seven means a higher level of control 
intervention in the judicial process.   
I take use of the two variables average protection against expropriation by government and 
legal formalism from the dataset as composed and used by (Acemoglu & Johnson, Unbundling 
Institutions, 2005)10. 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita data is collected from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators11. GDP is given in current international USD, purchasing power 
parity (PPP) adjusted. Oil price data is also from the World Bank.  
Data for world oil production is from British Petroleum’s Statistical Review12.  
Finally, country-level data on country-size, latitude of capital and other geographical 
characteristics is gathered from CEPII (Mayer & Zignago, 2011)13.  
                                                 
10 Data available from the authors’ home page: http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/acemoglu/data/aj2005  
11 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD  
12 Data available at: http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-bp/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-
energy.html  
13 Data available at: http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/download.asp?id=6 (login required).  
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To use data from various sources requires thorough research and data formatting. I clean the 
data so that all country names match prior to merging, in cases where standard three-letter 
country codes were not available.   
 
The data structure is three-dimensional, with observations of individuals 𝑖  in a country 𝑗 over 
time 𝑡. Each vessel has a unique IMO number, which serves as the identification variable 𝑖. 
Each contract is assigned a country 𝑗 where the work will be executed and under whose 
legislature the contract applies to. Time 𝑡 represents a given year from 1995 to 2013. 
I calculate the mean day rate for each vessel in a specific country in a specific year. The 
contracts do not necessarily end by the end of a year, so the data needs to be treated before 
calculating the correct mean value for each vessel-country-year. The concept of vessel-
country-years is something I will refer to when further describing the data. I want the mean 
value of all day rates for contracts that started in a specific country in a specific year. So that 
when a vessel changes country in one year, I capture the potential difference in Polity score 
between the two countries. 
First, I rectangularize the data set, so that all interactions of IMO number and start date of a 
contract is available, i.e. all dates for all years 1995-2013 are filled in for all vessels. Then, the 
day rate of a contract is filled in for as many days as the contract lasts. Further, I collapse the 
data so that I get the mean day rate one vessel obtained in all the countries visited for all vessel-
years. The panel identifier now is the vessels IMO number.  
The dependent variable in my model interprets as the mean day rate in nominal US dollars per 
vessel-country-year. For instance, the mean day rate a vessel earned in Norway in 2005. If the 
vessel relocates to Angola during 2005, the contract day rate earned in Angola that year is 
calculated separately. For the sake of avoiding outliers, I delete the 1 % and 99 % percentile 
of the day rate observations.    
Why calculate the mean earned day rate for each country-year? One, the explanatory variable 
of interest, namely Polity, has annual scores. If I were to measure the effect of a country’s 
Polity score in one year on the earned day rate of a random contract in the same year, I would 
have to argue that there is no unobserved changes in Polity during that year.  
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Two, the obtained day rate can be compared with a vessel’s wage in a given year. The average 
wage is the average of all contracts that given year. Long and short contracts are equally 
weighted. To put this clearly, consider a vessel going on a one-day contract all days during 
one year in a country. The rate, for the sake of illustration, is USD 1. The total amount is $1 
times 364 days. The last day of the year, something happens and the contract is prolonged to 
last 364 days into the next year. The average rate in this case will be 
1×364+364×1
365
= 2 ∗ (
364
365
) ≈ 2. 
If I simply calculated the average, the math would be 
1+364
2
=
365
2
≫ 2. 
I.e., the short contract would be heavily overweighted. 
Third, this reduces the amount of noise in my data. Regressing all day rates as given by start 
date would result in higher standard error values and less efficient estimates.  
Furthermore, I calculate the median duration of all contracts fixed for each vessel in all years. 
The median is a more eligible measure than the mean in this case, as contract duration can 
vary greatly during one year for each vessel. This depends on whether the vessel is placed in 
the spot or term market, or switch between the two.  
 
The baseline model, where all variables are the time-demeaned: 
𝑢𝑠𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒̈ 𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦̈ 𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒̈ 𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛̈ 𝑡𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛̈ 𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝐷1,1995𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟̈ 1995 + ⋯ + 𝐷19,2013𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟̈ 2013 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 
The dependent variable 𝑢𝑠𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 is the mean day rate for a vessel in a given country in a given 
year. The time-demeaned 𝑢𝑠𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒̈ 𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the influence on day rates following deviations from 
the mean of the explanatory variables. The explanatory variable of interest is 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦. In 
addition, I control for geographical variation, oil production as measure for demand and the 
median duration of contracts.   
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In the model, 𝑖 represent the individual vessel, 𝑗 is the country denominator and 𝑡 represents 
the years 1995 through 2013. Latitude is the latitude in degrees for a country’s capital. Latitude 
is constant for each capital across time, except in cases where a country changes capital. Oil 
production is the country’s oil production in a given year. Median contract duration is the 
median duration of contract length in number of days for a vessel in a country-year. The model 
contains dummy variables for all years, where 1995 represents the base year.    
Median contract duration is the median of all contracts a vessel enters in that year. If no new 
contract terms were started, for instance if the vessel is on a contract that started the year 
before, no values for contract duration is reported. This way, by including the median contract 
duration as an explanatory variable, I only regress a country’s Polity score on mean day rates 
in years were the rate was agreed upon and fixed. This makes sense, because a change in Polity 
score the next year will anyway not affect day rates fixed the year before; the rate is constant 
throughout the contract period. 
Market analysts often uses term utilization as a measure for capacity in the market when they 
predict future demand. However, I consider term utilization rates irrelevant in this model. One, 
this model is not predictive. Two, utilization rates are published monthly and there will be 
very little variation in year averages. The term utilization is a medium to short-term measure. 
The utilization rate is in general most important for spot market prices. However, I use the 
term utilization rates for robustness checks of the main result.   
For a detailed description of the variables, see Appendix.  
 
The total number of observed PSVs is 765. The number vary across time, as old vessels are 
laid up and new ones enter the market. The data contain information on fixtures in the years 
1995 to 2013. A table of observations counted by country and by year is in Appendix (Table 
10-1 and Table 10-2). UK, Norway, United States and Brazil are the most dominating markets 
in terms of number of observations. For observations by year, the number increases in recent 
years. This is due to the fleet growth in fleet during the last decade. 
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Table 4-1 Summary statistics 
      
 Count Mean Min Max Std. Dev. 
Day rate (USD) 2469 19381.4 4200 53603 10313.2 
Polity 2469 9.26 -10 10 2.74 
Latitude in degrees 2469 43.4 -33.9 59.9 24.3 
Oil production (1000 barrels/day) 2469 2538.8 83 11525 1915.8 
Median contract duration 2469 292.1 1 3836 571.3 
DWT 2469 3442.1 450 7620 1139.4 
BHP 1904 7085.8 1500 15791 2471.2 
Vessel age 1904 11.3 -1 40 8.77 
Buildcost (MUSD) 1125 25.4 0.82 71.8 13.1 
Year 2469 2007.1 1995 2013 5.10 
NOTE: The table displays summary statistics for all variables. Day rates are given in nominal USD. Polity score 
is measured on a scale from -10 to 10, where 10 means that the country has good (democratic) institutions. 
Latitude in degrees is the latitude of a country’s capital. Oil production is measured in annual average of daily 
production, measured in 1000 barrels. Median contract duration is the median duration of all contracts that a 
vessel enters in each year. DWT stands for deadweight tons, and is a measure of the vessels freight capacity. 
BHP is an abbreviation for break horsepower, and measures the engine capacity. Vessel age is the number of 
years since the vessel entered service. Buildcost is the price in million USD that was paid for the construction of 
the vessel. Year is a dummy variable.   
 
A histogram of the distribution of day rates is shown in Appendix (Figure 10-1). The 
observations are somewhat skewed towards zero. Exact inference requires that the error term 
is independent of the explanatory variables and is normally distributed with zero mean 
variance. However, normality plays no role in the unbiasedness of OLS, nor does it affect the 
conclusion that OLS is the best linear unbiased estimators under the Gauss-Markov 
assumption (Wooldrigde, 2013, s. 167).  
Not all vessels change country during the observation period. Time-demeaning observations 
eliminate the effect of Polity on vessels that stay in the same country throughout the whole 
observation period. Because a minimum of variation is required, that means that vessels need 
to switch between countries with different Polity scores or that the Polity score changes over 
time. If the Polity score for some reason is constant, the effect is eliminated.  
Table 4-2 Number of countries visited per vessel 
       
 Count Mean Variance Std. Dev. Min. value Max. value 
Sum 1119 1.83 0.81 0.90 1 5 
NOTE: The table shows how many countries vessels visit on average. A value of 1 means that a vessel only visit 
one country. “Count” refers to the total number of vessel and country combinations, and must not be confused 
with total number of vessels observed.  
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The table describes how many times a vessel changes country. The values indicates number 
of countries visited. In other words, the average value of 1.83 means that a vessel on average 
visits two countries, i.e. change country once. The maximum number of countries visited is 
six. As much as 507 vessels only visit one country. This implies little variation in data. 
Alternative measures for dealing with this will be further discussed in the next section.  
Table 4-3 (below) shows the number of years registered per vessel. Some vessels are only 
observed one year, while the maximum is 30 country-years. The number is higher than the 19-
year period between 1995 and 2013, because in some years, a vessel changes country. I 
calculate mean day rate earned in each vessel’s country-year. The point is that if a vessel goes 
from one country to another with a different Polity score, this change will influence the 
calculated earned day rate. For instance, consider a vessel that has been operating in Norway 
in 2003, which has a Polity score of 10. The vessel is relocated to start a contract in Brazil the 
same year or the next, which has a Polity score of 8. With FE estimation, the influence of 
Polity score on day rate from that shift is the deviation from mean Polity score for all 
observations of that specific vessel.       
Figure 4-1 (next page) shows the global development in mean day rates for all vessel-years 
together with average annual Brent spot price measured in nominal USD per barrel. The vessel 
day rates are quite volatile. The day rate and the oil price are closely related. A drop in oil 
prices will cause lower activity in the oil and gas sector, which again lead to lower demand 
for offshore services.  In 2008, the oil prices dropped due to the financial crisis and so did the 
PSV day rates.  
Table 4-3 Number of country-years observed per vessel  
       
 Count Mean Variance Std. Dev. Min. value Max. value 
Sum 2468 7.14 36.23 6.02 1 30 
NOTE: Descriptive statistics for number of country-years observed for all vessels. Only years where the vessel 
actually started a contract in the respective countries are included.  
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Figure 4-1 Earned day rates (Platform Supply Vessels) and oil price (Brent spot) 
 
Figure 4-2 Mean earned day rates by country 
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Figure 4-2 above displays day rates observed in Brazil (South America), Norway (Northwest 
Europe), Angola (West Africa) and Australia (South Pacific). These countries represent one 
of the leading markets in their respective regions.  
Day rates in Norway follow the same path as global development. Because Norway is one of 
the markets with the most observations, the day rate level from this region is very dominating 
when calculation the world average. A figure of the global average day rates compared with 
Norway and UK is in the Appendix, Figure 10-2. Rates in Brazil have seen a steady growth, 
and Brazil was the only country of the four where day rates did not drop because of the 
financial crisis. We see that the day rates in Australia lie high above the level in the other 
countries displayed in graph. 
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In this section I will present and interpret the baseline results. Furthermore, I will discuss the 
results and suggest qualitative explanations by putting them into perspective14. 
 
Figure 5-1 suggests a positive relationship between day rates and Polity score. This is the 
relationship of main interest.  
Figure 5-1 The relationship between mean day rates and average Polity score 
 
Countries in the Middle East region, like Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
all have low average Polity scores over across the observation period. Hiring a PSV is, on 
average, cheaper in this region. In the other end, we have the typical western countries, 
including all the countries belonging to the Northwest Europe region (Norway, UK, Denmark, 
                                                 
14 I sometimes use the expression «cause» freely, for the sake of variety in language. However, I am not establishing a causal 
relationship of variables on day rates, as OLS estimation only disclose correlation.   
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Netherlands, France, etc.). However, just plotting the values is merely suggestive. Low rates 
in the Middle East might be due to smaller vessels, mild environmental conditions and so on. 
Empirical testing of this relationship allows us to control for such factors.    
Table 5-1 (next page) shows the output from four different regressions. The output from 
regression (1) is the FE estimates. Regression (2) shows the OLS estimates on the same model. 
Regression (3) is OLS estimation where vessel-specific characteristics are controlled for, like 
freight capacity, engine capacity, building cost and age15. Because this reduces sample size by 
half, I have added the results from a regression number (4), where I use the fixed-effects 
approach on same sample as the expanded model.  
The dependent variable is mean day rates earned in a given country in a given year, referred 
to as a country-year. The FE estimator eliminate all time-invariant variables connected to the 
vessels. These will therefore not influence day rates.   
The output from regression (1) is the baseline result. The relationship between day rates and 
Polity score is significant when standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. One unit 
increase in Polity score yields an increase in mean day rate that a vessel earns in a country-
year of US$ 336.8. However, unless the time-invariant factors removed by the FE estimator 
are the only factors that causes biased estimates, I cannot establish that this is a causal 
relationship. Considering that the mean day rate in the sample is above 19,000 USD, the 
economic significance is not substantial.  
Reporting the OLS estimates reveals the difference in the relationship of interest when the 
variables are not time-demeaned. The estimated coefficients on Polity is not very different 
from each other, which might indicate that the fixed-effects is economically not very 
significant. Nonetheless, the estimate is slightly smaller. The OLS estimate is suffering from 
a positive omitted variable bias.  
Regression (3) shows OLS estimation on a model where certain vessel characteristics are 
controlled for. Regression (3) aim to control for this by including controls for size, engine 
                                                 
15 Age is not constant over time. However, because there are not enough observations of vessel over longer periods, age was 
eliminated from the time-demeaned equation.  
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capacity, age and building cost. This reduces the estimated coefficient of Polity. Still, the 
correlation between day rate and Polity score is significant and positive.  
However, the output in (1) and (2) is not comparable with (3) and (4). Lack of observations 
for vessel properties reduce the sample size by half. By using the fixed-effects method on the 
reduced sample size, I observe that when controlling for all time-invariant factors, the effect 
of Polity on day rate is no longer significantly different from zero.      
Table 5-1 Baseline results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FE, main 
model 
OLS, main 
model 
OLS, 
expanded 
model 
FE, expanded  
model sample 
Polity 336.8** 372.6*** 224.1** 137.3 
 (108.9) (61.58) (71.88) (87.69) 
     
Latitude in degrees -95.62*** -38.59*** -94.26*** -110.0*** 
 (15.87) (9.913) (10.84) (19.15) 
     
Oil production (1000 
barrels/day) 
0.953*** -0.871*** -0.686*** 0.312 
 (0.274) (0.110) (0.162) (0.414) 
     
Median contract 
duration 
-2.211*** 1.864*** -0.367 -1.907** 
 (0.486) (0.428) (0.397) (0.618) 
     
DWT   2.205***  
   (0.474)  
     
BHP   0.467**  
   (0.172)  
     
Vessel age   -288.8***  
   (51.37)  
     
Build cost (MUSD)   -46.21  
   (32.69)  
Dependent variable Mean day 
rate 
Mean day 
rate 
Mean day  
rate 
Mean day  
rate 
Observations 2469 2469 1125 1125 
R-sq. 0.370 0.0500 0.167 0.360 
Standard errors in parentheses 
NOTE: The table shows the baseline regression output. Year dummies are included in all models, but not 
reported. For a complete table including year dummy coefficients, see Appendix. All standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity-robust.   
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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A way to check for heterogeneity is by using interaction terms. Interaction terms allow the 
partial effect of an explanatory variable, to depend on the level of another variable, and vice 
versa. The coefficient on one variable, measure the partial effect of that variable when the 
other variable included in the interaction term is equal to zero (Wooldrigde, 2013).  I will use 
interactions with Polity and the other explanatory variables from the main model, with the 
purpose of checking whether the effect of Polity changes for different values of the 
explanatory variables. The results are displayed in Table 5-2 below.  
Table 5-2 Model with interaction terms. FE estimates. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Day rate (USD) Day rate (USD) Day rate (USD) 
Polity 331.7** 132.4 359.2** 
 (118.5) (111.8) (113.5) 
    
Latitude in degrees -97.56* -96.24*** -96.05*** 
 (39.45) (15.71) (15.87) 
    
Oil production (1000 barrels/day) 0.953*** -0.0410 0.949*** 
 (0.275) (0.246) (0.273) 
    
Median contract duration -2.209*** -2.171*** -1.893 
 (0.492) (0.482) (0.991) 
    
Latitude*Polity 0.231   
 (4.519)   
    
Polity*Oil Production  0.120***  
  (0.0260)  
    
Polity*Median Duration   -0.0392 
   (0.109) 
Observations 2469 2469 2469 
R2 0.370 0.372 0.370 
Standard errors in parentheses 
NOTE: The table shows the FE estimates from the main model with added interaction terms. Year dummies are 
included in all models, but not reported. All standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.   
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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The baseline result is significant and positive when and interaction variable between Polity 
and latitude is included, as in regression (1), and between Polity and median contract duration, 
as in model (3). However, the interaction term in regression (2) shows that there is a significant 
non-linear relationship between Polity and oil production. The interpretation of the coefficient 
is that the effect of Polity on day rates is higher in countries with higher oil production. Lastly, 
the coefficient on Polity is no longer significant from zero in regression (3). Because of strong 
correlation between Polity and the interaction term, the separate effects on day rate are hard 
to distinguish.  
Robustness can be described as how well the estimated coefficients respond to changes in the 
error term. If the regression output changes drastically, the results are not robust. All results 
from robustness checks is found in the Appendix, Table 10-4. 
Clustering standard errors is method used to check for robustness. Because of intraclass 
correlation due to group effects, I cluster the standard errors on both individual and group 
levels, in this case that means on vessel and country. Sometimes, clustering can be crucial for 
drawing correct statistical inference. As we see in Table 10-4 in the Appendix, the relationship 
between Polity and day rate remains significant when standard errors are robust to both 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Country-level effects does not obliterate the estimate 
significance.  
Another way to check whether results are robust or not is to regress the dependent variable on 
different combinations of the explanatory variables. One way to look at it is how the regression 
output changes when potential covariates are “taken out” of the error term. The Appendix 
Table 10-4 shows the results when explanatory variables are added one by one. The 
relationship between day rates and Polity is significantly different from zero only when the 
median duration of contracts is included in the model. Adding potential covariates such as the 
term utilization rate and oil price does not alter the baseline results.  
 
The positive relationship between Polity and day rates may appear surprising at first glance. 
Assume that countries with lower Polity score are less politically stable and more risky. The 
party with the operational risk, which in this case is the shipowner, will require a risk premium 
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as compensation. Why does better institutions drive rates upwards, when factors such as 
individual properties, geographical location, duration of contract and market demand are 
controlled for? 
A potential explanation to this positive correlation is through the causal relationship of 
institutions and economic growth. If countries with good institutions indeed are richer, the 
general higher price level of goods might cause higher prices also in the offshore supply 
market16. Consider the option in which countries with good institutions more able to construct 
a framework for sustainable protection of their own economy. Requirements to local content 
can drive prices up when the requirements influence the main cost drivers. Crew cost is a 
prime example. If a shipowner is required to use local workforce, and the wage level in the 
country is relatively high, this will drive OPEX up, which again is reflected in higher day rates.  
In cases where vessels do not change between countries, which is the case for a substantial 
number of vessels in the sample, the effect of crew costs is eliminated when using the FE 
approach. However, because the OLS estimates also report a positive and significant 
correlation when crew costs are not controlled for, the hypothesis of high crew costs in 
countries with higher institutional quality holds. OLS estimation does not eliminate the 
influence of time-invariant variables on day rates.     
The positive coefficient on oil production indicates that an increase in a country’s oil 
production implies increased mean day rates earned for a vessel in the corresponding country-
year. The correlation is positive despite the fact that Saudi Arabia is substantial outlier, with 
the by far highest reported oil production and low day rates. See Figure 10-3 in the Appendix. 
Every thousands of barrels increase in production yields a US$ 0.953 increase in day rate17. 
The economic significance seems quite low, but keep in mind that that difference in oil 
production is great between countries – in 2013, the lowest registered production was 116,000 
barrels and the highest 11,635,000 barrels. A potential explanation is that the demand for 
                                                 
16 The positive correlation between GDP per capita and price level is often referred to as the Penn-effect. The effect that 
causes non-tradable goods to be relatively more expensive in rich countries is called the Balassa-Samuelson. These two effects 
are commonly used interchangeably. A more detailed description of the effects will be given in section 6 of this thesis. 
17 Or, potentially, the other way around. Unless the FE removes all correlation between the explanatory variable and the error 
term, I cannot conclude that a relationship is causal.  
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offshore services increases when oil production increases. Because supply in the short-term is 
relatively inelastic, this will cause an increase in prices.  
Alternatively, the positive correlation between high oil production and day rates adds to the 
hypothesis above, which connects a country’s GDP per capita, price level and day rates. The 
result adds to this hypothesis in the sense that countries with high oil production are rich on 
black gold. Higher GDP per capita thus results in higher day rates, overlooking outliers such 
as Saudi Arabia. Whether institutional quality influence earned day rates through a country’s 
GDP per capita will be further investigated in the next section.  
Latitude holds constant the effect of geographical differences, such as climate. Because 
latitude south of Equator is negative, the interpretation of the coefficient is that everything else 
constant, the further south a country’s capital is located, the higher the day rate. This supports 
the relationship displayed in Figure 5-2 (next page).  
By adding the region Australia/New Zealand as explanatory variable, I control for the effects 
that the region have on a vessel’s estimated earned day rate. The regression output is reported 
in the Appendix Table 10-5. Controlling for day rates observed in Australia/New Zealand does 
not alter the significant positive relationship between Polity and estimated earned day rates. 
However, earned day rate for a vessel in a country-year is significantly higher when the vessel 
is in the Australia/New Zealand region than when it is somewhere else in the world. The table 
also includes regression output when the regions Northwest Europe, South America and West 
Africa (respectively) are included in the model. Of the included regions, only Australia/New 
Zealand has significant influence on mean earned day rates when the effect of Polity score, 
latitude, median contract duration, oil production and year effects are held constant.   
The practical interpretation of latitude is more complex. That day rates are higher in the South 
stands in opposition to a conventional economic postulation, which consider the poor “South” 
compared to the richer “North”. If countries in the North indeed are richer, we should expect 
day rates to be higher the further North. In economic theory, this is called the Penn effect. 
According to the Penn effect, the price level is higher in countries with higher GDP per capita.     
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Figure 5-2 Mean day rates on the latitude of capital 
  
A potential, although speculative, explanation of why day rates in the South are higher can be 
greater distances. Distances between operations, which leads to a higher day rate because of 
expensive mobilization/demobilization fees, and distances internally from the shore to the 
offshore installations. Both will reflect an increase in day rates due to higher operational costs.  
The estimated coefficient of median contract duration implies that longer contracts have 
relatively lower day rates. A practical interpretation would be that if the charterer guarantees 
the owner a fixed income for a long period, the owner is willing to agree to a lower rate.   
The conclusion from this section is that there is a significant and robust positive relationship 
between a country’s Polity score and earned mean day rates in the corresponding country for 
a vessel in a given year. However, I cannot rule out that a negative relationship between Polity 
score and day rates exists. Here, if there indeed is a negative effect, the positive effect 
dominates the negative. Nonetheless, political risk may be still influence day rates indirectly. 
To investigate this further, the next section uses the instrumental variables approach to look at 
potential channels through which institutional works.  
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What is institutional quality? The Polity ranking measures institutional quality in terms of 
democracy. Democracy is a composite term; it is hardly achievable to give a brief, exact 
explanation of what a democratic institution is.  
Using instrument variables is useful in two ways. One, it establishes a causal relationship 
between the independent and the dependent variable by removing all endogenous variation in 
the error term, and two, if the instrument is good, the instrumented variable is the only channel 
through which the instrument is correlated with outcome.  
In the global society, everything is connected in some way or the other. The question here is 
not whether institutional quality does matter for day rates, but through which mechanisms. In 
this section, I will use Polity as instrument for a chosen set of variables, with the purpose of 
investigating through which channels institutional quality influences day rates. Whether the 
exclusion restriction holds is not a key concern here, because I am not trying to disclose a 
causal relationship between the instrumented variables and the dependent variable, but to see 
whether Polity is working through either of these channels. This application of IV might seem 
a bit unorthodox. In other words, the first-stage equations is the most interesting. I report the 
2SLS estimator as well, but I do not spend too much time arguing whether this is the real 
causal effect on day rates or not.        
I use GDP per capita, average risk against expropriation and legal formalism as potential 
channels for different reasons. How GDP per capita constitutes be an interesting channel is 
discussed below. The latter two are examples of unbundling institutions. Because institutional 
quality is a broad term, I want to see what type of institutions cause the Polity score to 
influence day rates.     
 
Day rate per vessel in a given country-year is the dependent variable. The model is the same 
as the one represented in baseline results, where the Polity variable is replaced by GDP per 
capita, average risk against expropriation and legal formalism, respectively. All standard 
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.   
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Table 6-1 Summary statistics for instrumented variables 
      
 Count Mean Min Max Std. Dev. 
GDP per Capita 
(logarithmic scale) 
(World Bank) 
3805 10.3 7.01 11.8 0.65 
Average risk 
against 
expropriation 
3782 9.18 4.68 10 1.17 
Legal Formalism 3646 2.89 1.80 5.25 0.45 
NOTE: The table shows summary statistics for the instrumented variables that is used in this section. GDP per 
capita is collected from the World Bank, and transformed to logarithmic scale Average risk against expropriation 
is measured on a ten point scale, where 0 indicates high expropriation risk and 10 low expropriation risk (good 
protection). This is a proxy for property rights institutions. Legal formalism is measured on a scale from 1 to 7, 
where higher legal formalism indicates more costly contracting processes between private parties.  
 
 
 
Academic research concludes that institutions are important for a country’s economic 
development. A country’s GDP per capita is a common measure for this. According to the 
Penn effect, the price level is higher in countries where GDP per capita is relatively high. 
Furthermore, the Balassa-Samuelson effect, which the Penn effect is often invoked to derive, 
says that in countries with a productive workforce, the real wage level will increase in all 
sectors and cause the relative price of non-tradable goods to increase. The correlation between 
GDP per capita and the Balassa-Samuelson effect is generally attributed to higher relative 
prices of non-tradables in wealthier economies18.  
With this in mind, may Polity score have a positive effect on rates because good institutions 
makes countries richer and therefore more expensive? According to the Penn effect, the day 
rates are higher because the price level is in general higher in richer countries. Because labor 
costs represents a large share of operating costs, the Balassa-Samuelson offers an additional 
                                                 
18 For a theoretical derivation of "the equilibrium real exchange rate, the relative price of nontraded to traded goods", see 
Neary (1988). Neary writes on the Balassa-Samuelson effect: "Bela Balassa (1964) and Paul Samuelson (1964) argue that 
(...) deviations from purchasing power parity are to be expected because higher-income countries have higher relative 
productivity in the production of traded goods." Neary (1988) also explains how a boom in a resource sector may lead to a 
real appreciation, so-called Dutch Disease.   
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explanation, namely that day rates are higher in richer countries because of requirements to 
use of local workforce.   
By using Polity as an instrument for GDP per capita, I will investigate if GDP per capita is a 
channel for though which Polity influence day rates.  
Polity is a good instrument for GDP per capita only if Polity is exogonously given, that is, 
uncorrelated with the model error term, and if it relevant. The last criteria is met, as proved 
through the baseline results. Reasoning is the only way to defend whether GDP per capita is 
the only channel through which Polity is correlated with day rates, known as the exclusion 
restriction. This is not possible to test, because the error term is unobserved. The concept of 
institutional quality is very broad. The assumption of exogeneity is rather unrealistic, and 
whether this assumption holds is not the main focus here. 
The error term contains factors that affect day rates and that are not controlled for. Some are 
unobserved, such as the ability of the crew, and some are omitted due to lack of data. 
Requirements to local content is considered to have impact on day rates. “Local content” 
usually refers to what share of local workforce the shipowner is obliged to use in the crew. 
Crew costs is one of the main operational costs for a shipowner, and if the local content 
requirements are high, the wage level of the offshore workers will be important for the day 
rate.  
If Polity is indeed a good instrument for GDP per capita for measuring the causal effect on 
day rates, the 2SLS coefficient represents the more correct effect.  
The first stage estimate show that Polity has significant, positive effect on GDP per capita. 
This corresponds well to the wide literature pointing at institutions as important for economic 
development. One unit increase in Polity induces 5.13% increase in nominal GDP per capita 
(or, potentially, the other way around). We can conclude that Polity is a relevant instrument. 
The “reduced form” is the direct effect of Polity on day rates. This is the same result as 
presented in as the baseline result. 
Although it is hard to argue that Polity is completely exogenous, the regression output 
indicates that GDP per capita is indeed a channel through which institutional quality influence 
day rates. Using Polity as an instrument for GDP per capita, the 2SLS ratio indicates that GDP 
per capita has 4 times larger impact on day rates compared to the structural equation.  
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Table 6-2 Polity as instrument for GDP per capita.  
 Structural Reduced Form First Stage 2SLS 
GDP per capita (log) 2164.7*   7868.4** 
 (975.1)   (2971.9) 
     
Polity  336.8*** 0.0513***  
  (100.8) (0.0113)  
Dependent variable Day rate 
(USD) 
Day rate 
(USD) 
Log GDP per 
cap 
Day rate 
(USD) 
Instrumental variable - - - Polity 
Observations 2141 2141 2469 2141 
Standard errors in parentheses 
NOTE: The table shows the regression results in all stages of the IV method when Polity is used as instrument 
for GDP per capita (logarithmic scale). FE estimates. GDP per capita (logarithmic scale) is in current USD. Day 
rate is measured in nominal USD. Year dummies are included in the model. All regressions use the fixed-effects 
approach, following the model from the baseline results. Year dummies for the years 1995-2013 are included. 
Standard errors are heterogeneity-robust. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
That day rates are high in countries with good institutions because countries with good 
institutions in general are richer, and that requirements to local content causes operating costs 
to increase because of high wage levels in richer countries, is a valid explanation of the positive 
correlation between the average earned day rate in a given country-year and Polity score.    
Although the result shows that GDP per capita is correlated with Polity, this does not clarify 
whether there exists a negative effect between institutional quality and day rates. Risk averse 
shipowners may still demand compensation for operating in areas considered less safe. Below, 
I will look into this by using Polity score as instrument for average protection against 
government expropriation. That way, we will see if political risk, which is a factor in this 
measure of property rights, is a channel for institutional quality to influence day rates.  
 
Acemoglu & Johnson (2005) use average protection against government expropriation as a 
proxy for property rights institutions. Property rights institutions relate to the relationship 
between the state and the citizens. The authors find strong support that countries with good 
property rights institutions have substantially higher long-term growth rates.  
Again, Polity is a good instrument for average expropriation risk if Polity is relevant and 
exogenously given. Polity is related to expropriation protection in the way that a high Polity 
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score is a sign of well-developed democratic institutions, and thus good property rights 
institutions. The first-stage regression estimates will show if the relevance criteria is met. 
The reduced form equation is similar to the model in baseline results, which proves that a 
country’s Polity score has direct impact on average day rates. The 2SLS estimate represents 
the true effect of GDP per capita on supply vessel day rates, presumed that both the relevance 
and exogenous criteria are satisfied. The regression outputs are presented in the table below. 
The structural equation estimate indicates a significant positive relationship between average 
protection against expropriation risk and day rates. Better protection against expropriation by 
government indicates higher day rates. The economic significance is substantial, and counts 
1,157.8 USD. The reduced form estimate is equal to the baseline result, showing Polity’s direct 
influence on day rates. The first stage equation shows that Polity is a relevant instrument, as 
the relationship between Polity and the instrumented variable is significant. The coefficient 
interprets as for each unit increase in Polity score, the better the protection against 
expropriation.  
Table 6-3 Polity as instrument for average protection against expropriation by 
government 
 Structural Reduced Form First Stage 2SLS 
Average risk 
against 
expropriation 
1157.8**   1664.4*** 
 (395.4)   (483.0) 
     
Polity  336.8*** 0.220***  
  (100.8) (0.0154)  
Dependent variable Day rate 
(USD) 
Day rate 
(USD) 
Av. Expr. Prot. Day rate 
(USD) 
Instrumental 
variable 
- - - Polity 
Observations 2140 2141 2465 2140 
Standard errors in parentheses 
NOTE: The table shows the regression results in all stages of the IV method when Polity is used as instrument 
for average risk against expropriation. FE estimates. Average risk against expropriation is measured on a ten 
point scale, where 0 indicates high expropriation risk and 10 low expropriation risk (good protection). Day rate 
is measured in nominal USD. Year dummies are included in the model. All regressions use the fixed-effects 
approach, following the model from the baseline results. Year dummies for the years 1995-2013 are included. 
Standard errors are heterogeneity-robust. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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The 2SLS ratio suggests that the better property rights institutions in a country, the higher will 
the day rate level be, when vessel characteristics, geographical aspects, median contract 
duration, market demand measured by oil production and year effects are constant, and when 
the variation caused by a country’s Polity score is eliminated. If property rights institutions is 
the only channel through which a country’s Polity score influence day rates, the 2SLS estimate 
suggests a significant positive effect. Because good protection against expropriation is 
associated with institutions being of high quality, it is intuitive that property rights institutions 
influence day rates in the same direction as a country’s Polity score.  
Alternatively, the positive correlation between expropriation risk and day rates may be linked 
to vessel capital costs. Capital costs, or investment cost, is together with operating costs the 
main component of a vessel’s cost structure. As mentioned previously, some counties require 
that vessels are built locally in order to be granted right to operate. Hence, the explanation as 
to why day rates are higher in countries with good property rights institutions might be that in 
these countries, investors are willing to invest more in the offshore supply market industry.   
 
Legal formalism is used as proxy for contracting institutions. Higher degree of legal formalism 
indicates more costly contracting processes between private parties. A lower legal formalism 
index value should intuitively be positive for day rates as this makes contracting between 
private parties less costly.   
The structural equation estimate reveals that the degree of legal formalism has no significant 
effect on mean vessel day rates observed in a country-year. On the other hand, the first stage 
regression result displays a significant negative relationship between Polity and legal 
formalism. Better Polity score signifies a lower score on the legal formalism index and thus 
lower level of control intervention in the judicial process.  
The relationship between institutional quality and contracting institutions is negative, which 
in this application means that better institutions yields less costly legal procedures. When 
Polity is used as instrument, the effect of legal formalism on day rates becomes negative. 
However, the relationship is not significantly different from zero. Using Polity as instrument 
for legal formalism when measuring the effect of legal formalism on PSV day rates yields no 
significant effects. As the structural equation shows, contracting institutions does not matter 
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for the earned day rates in a country. Institutional quality as measured by a country’s Polity 
score does not influence day rates through this type of institutions.  
Table 6-4 Polity as instrument for legal formalism 
 Structural Reduced Form First Stage 2SLS 
Legal formalism 297.0   -3515.9 
 (890.8)   (2029.4) 
     
Polity  336.8*** -0.0997***  
  (100.8) (0.0142)  
Dependent variable Day rate 
(USD) 
Day rate 
(USD) 
Legal 
Formalism 
Day rate 
(USD) 
Instrumental 
variable 
- - - Polity 
Observations 2101 2141 2410 2101 
Standard errors in parentheses 
NOTE: The table shows the regression results in all stages of the IV method when Polity is used as instrument 
for legal formalism. FE estimates. Legal formalism is measured on a scale from one to 7, where a higher score 
indicates a more costly legal procedure. Day rate is measured in nominal USD. Year dummies are included in 
the model. All regressions use the fixed-effects approach, following the model from the baseline results. Year 
dummies for the years 1995-2013 are included. Standard errors are heterogeneity-robust. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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The market data used in this thesis are, as described by the providers, a tool to support private 
and public actors in decision-making processes. To the extent of my search for literature, I 
have not found published empirical studies based on the same data. A possible explanation is 
that access to these data is expensive. As a result, there have been no easy solutions or shortcuts 
throughout the process, and I have spent much time on data treatment and structure. That the 
data in general were challenging to access and use is no exaggeration.  
In the process of structuring the data set, a few necessary adjustments were made. Out of a 
total of more than 10,000 observations of contract fixtures, 27 of these were so-called 
duplicates, where a vessel has registered the start of two different contracts on the same day. 
Because Stata needs a unique combination of panel and time variables, these duplicates were 
deleted. I count the impact of this on output as insignificant.  
Another obstacle occurs with merging many different data sets. Thorough checks to see that 
everything merged correctly were made, but in a data set with many observations, errors due 
to unrecognized differences may have occurred.   
In the literature survey, I cite two master theses. These are considered only as inspiration, and 
do not serve as basis for any of my research conclusions.  
Cost drivers are important when analyzing prices. However, these are not always easily 
identified or accessible. I have used qualitative information from market players to help 
identify costs and factors that can possibly explain differences in market prices between 
countries. This, in combination with annual reports and lectures in offshore service markets at 
NHH serves as sources for identifying cost drivers. Some of the factors who are highlighted 
as main drivers are not easily accessed figures. The model includes data available within the 
scope of a master thesis. In developing the final model, I try to compensate for such 
weaknesses through the applied econometric techniques.   
Throughout the thesis, I use the Polity IV score as measure for institutional quality. This is a 
composite index. Other measures for institutional quality might give other results. Therefore, 
the conclusion is not generic, and should be further challenged before one can confirm and 
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describe the nature of the relationship between institutional quality and day rates for platform 
supply vessels with complete confidence.  
Seeing the world as one entity is ambitious when trying to estimate a model. A more exact 
economic relationship might be easier to identify by splitting up in fewer regions, or compare 
two countries. Cost drivers are potentially easier to identify within a region, and a model on 
this basis would probably be more accurate. On the other hand, the aim of this thesis was not 
to estimate a predictive model.   
A comment to the use of variables in section 6 (“Polity as instrument”): the wage level in the 
offshore sector need not be representative of the wage level in the country as a whole. A strong 
union might push the wage level up, in particular if the workforce is protected. Strict 
requirements to local workforce in the offshore sector is a way of workforce protection. 
According to the combined Penn and Balassa-Samuelson effect, countries with higher GDP 
per capita will also have higher wage levels. GDP per capita is therefore used as potential 
channel here, instead of the specific wage level of a country.     
The estimated baseline model aims to disclose a significant correlation between a country’s 
Polity score and vessel day rates. The model does not say whether the relationship is causal or 
not. Section 6 discusses a causal relationship between proxies for types of institutions and day 
rates, when Polity score is used as instrument for these proxies. Because I do not spend more 
time arguing whether the institutional quality score is exogenously given, i.e. that the 
exclusion restriction holds, I cannot conclude with a causal relationship. 
Lastly, I analyze only one branch of the offshore supply vessel market. An interesting topic 
for further research would be to do a similar study of related markets, such as the offshore rig 
market. The thesis also focus on the role of crew cost and it would be interesting to collect 
data on crew cost in different countries and see if there is a relationship between crew cost, 
operating costs and institutional quality. Another parameter that would be interesting to look 
at is the tax legislation in the offshore industry around the world, and see if there is a significant 
relationship between day rates, institutional quality and tax rates.  
 57 
 
There is a significant, robust positive correlation between institutional quality as measured by 
Polity score and earned average day rates for a PSV in that country in the corresponding year, 
when geographical aspects, market demand measured by a country’s oil production, median 
contract duration and year effects are controlled for. Conclusively, the quality of a country’s 
institutions as measured by the Polity IV score matters for day rates observed in the years 1995 
– 2013. 
By using Polity as instrument for GDP per capita, I aim to discover whether the positive 
relationship between Polity score and day rates is due to richer countries in general being more 
expensive. I find that GDP per capita has significant influence on day rates, and by using Polity 
score as instrument the influence is even greater. Thus, it seems that the correlation between 
GDP per capita and institutional quality serves as a possible explanation as to why a country’s 
Polity score indeed has significant influence on day rates in the PSV market.  
According to industry insiders, crew cost represents a substantial share of operating costs for 
shipowners. High wage levels combined with stringent requirements to local workforce is 
likely to result in higher OPEX and thus making a vessel more expensive to hire. Using the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect as argument, a country’s GDP per capita serve as proxy for wage 
level. I find that GDP per capita have significant direct influence on day rates, and that by 
using Polity as instrument, the effect of GDP per capita on day rates is almost 4 times stronger. 
The offshore supply industry is global, with the presence of competition across countries. 
Hypothetically, we would expect price and cost to equal across countries. However, to the 
extent there is a non-trivial amount of non-tradable inputs needed, we would expect that costs 
differ depending on the price differences of non-tradables. This is what seems to be the case 
here, where local requirements to input such as workforce drive costs up where this input is 
expensive. 
“Institutions” is a broad term. By using proxies for the two type of institutions identified by 
Acemoglu & Johnson (2005) and using Polity as instrument for the two, I find that Polity  
influence day rates through property rights institutions, while contracting institutions as 
measured by degree of legal formalism does not matter for observed day rates.  
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The relationship between institutional quality and rates is ex ante ambiguous. A negative effect 
would be consistent with shipowners needing compensation to operate in countries with low 
quality institutions, e.g. due to high political risk. A positive effect, on the other hand, may be 
explained by higher costs in rich countries. The results presented in this thesis show that the 
latter seems to dominate. Furthermore, institutional quality seems to influence day rates 
through property rights institutions rather than contracting institutions.   
The effect of institutions on economic development is a much researched and debated issue. 
Consensus lies on institutions being fundamental for a country’s economic performance. This 
thesis shows that institutional quality also influence prices in the global PSV market 
specifically. This gives us a window into operating costs in the related oil industry. That, 
however, is material for further research.   
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Day rate measured in nominal USD 
The day rate is the dependent variable in the model. The day rate is calculated as the mean day 
rate for each vessel earned a given country in a given year. The rate is measured in nominal 
US dollars. Year dummies will take into account inflation and changes in the global economy. 
Polity 
This is the explanatory variable of interest. I aim to estimate the relationship between Polity 
and average day rates obtained by a vessel in a given country.  
Latitude of capital in degrees 
I am interested in explaining a how a country’s relative polity-score affects the day rate 
independent of where on the planet the vessel is operating. Geographical aspects such as 
currents, climate and weather conditions controlled for by adding the latitude of the country’s 
capital. 
Median contract duration 
Spot and term are the existing market categories for contracts. A spot contract is defined as a 
contract with duration of 30 days or less. A risk averse operator will prefer longer contracts, 
to avoid the ship being laid-up in case of spot market excess capacity and low spot market day 
rates. On the other hand, if times are good and spot prices increase, the operator will miss 
potential revenue due to having his vessels fixed in long-term contracts. The volatile spot 
market rates will sometimes be higher and sometimes lower than long-term contract fixtures.  
It is tough claim to say that duration is always decided first and day rate second, especially for 
long-term charters. However, I choose to overlook this potential causality issue.  
Oil Production (1000 barrels/day) 
A PSVs main task is to supply the offshore oil activity. A reported high oil production 
implicates higher demand for offshore services. Oil companies’ exploration and production 
expenditures (E&P) is a common indicator for market activity. Due to data limitations, oil 
production in thousand barrels/day serves as measure for demand of offshore services.  
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Deadweight tons 
This is a measure of a vessel’s total freight capacity. 
Break Horsepower 
This measure the vessel’s engine capacity. 
Vessel age 
Vessel age is the vessel’s age measured in number of years since the vessel entered service. 
Build cost (nominal USD, millions) 
A vessel’s build cost is the price that was paid for building the vessel.     
Year Dummies, 1995 - 2013 
This dummy variable captures the year effect. The coefficients interprets as the effect on day 
rate given a particular year in reference to the base year, which is 1995. Year dummies controls 
for both observed and unobserved variation between years, like changes in the global economy 
and related factors. 
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Table 10-1 Number of observations by country 
  
Country Number of observations 
Angola 16 
Australia 4 
Azerbaijan 3 
Brazil 225 
Congo Brazzaville 10 
Denmark 73 
Egypt 6 
Equatorial Guinea 1 
Gabon 1 
India 13 
Indonesia 4 
Iran 4 
Italy 3 
Libya 4 
Malaysia 8 
Mexico 65 
Nigeria 16 
Norway 648 
Oman 1 
Qatar 9 
Saudi Arabia 7 
Thailand 3 
Tunisia 1 
UAE 3 
United Kingdom 1141 
United States 197 
Vietnam 3 
Total 2469 
NOTE: The table shows the number of observations by country that is included in the main model regression.  
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Table 10-2 Number of observations by year 
  
Year Number of observations 
1995 58 
1996 65 
1997 43 
1998 66 
1999 84 
2000 62 
2001 38 
2002 57 
2003 98 
2004 112 
2005 142 
2006 112 
2007 133 
2008 158 
2009 189 
2010 223 
2011 293 
2012 270 
2013 266 
Total 2469 
NOTE: The table shows the number of observations by year included in the regression on the main model.  
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Figure 10-1 Distribution of dependent variable (day rate) 
 
Figure 10-2 Development in global average day rates vs. UK and Norway 
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Table 10-3 Baseline results with year dummies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FE, main 
model 
OLS, main 
model 
OLS, 
expanded 
model 
FE, OLS 
expanded 
model sample 
Polity 336.8** 372.6*** 224.1** 137.3 
 (108.9) (61.58) (71.88) (87.69) 
     
Latitude in degrees -95.62*** -38.59*** -94.26*** -110.0*** 
 (15.87) (9.913) (10.84) (19.15) 
     
Oil production 
(1000 barrels/day) 
0.953*** -0.871*** -0.686*** 0.312 
 (0.274) (0.110) (0.162) (0.414) 
     
Median contract 
duration 
-2.211*** 1.864*** -0.367 -1.907** 
 (0.486) (0.428) (0.397) (0.618) 
     
DWT   2.205***  
   (0.474)  
     
BHP   0.467**  
   (0.172)  
     
Vessel age   -288.8***  
   (51.37)  
     
Buildcost (MUSD)   -46.21  
   (32.69)  
     
Year=1995 0   0 
 (.)   (.) 
     
Year=1996 2353.6*   -3865.4 
 (974.5)   (3182.2) 
     
Year=1997 8081.6***   1579.2 
 (1384.5)   (2443.4) 
     
Year=1998 9111.3***   4700.7** 
 (1079.7)   (1440.4) 
     
Year=1999 -2741.9**   -8308.8*** 
 (862.9)   (928.4) 
     
Year=2000 560.6   -5948.4*** 
 (1095.8)   (985.6) 
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Year=2001 7634.9***   901.7 
 (1412.3)   (2047.7) 
     
Year=2002 966.7   -6313.3*** 
 (1165.1)   (1541.4) 
     
Year=2003 -790.2   -7311.9*** 
 (1089.6)   (1029.7) 
     
Year=2004 2763.0   -3878.0*** 
 (1409.2)   (1080.8) 
     
Year=2005 10781.4***   3680.5** 
 (1396.9)   (1233.3) 
     
Year=2006 16693.5***   9194.0*** 
 (1779.7)   (1843.2) 
     
Year=2007 19669.3***   10886.9*** 
 (1722.3)   (1841.9) 
     
Year=2008 18670.5***   13016.2*** 
 (1486.5)   (1592.2) 
     
Year=2009 6527.5***   1128.3 
 (1327.4)   (1258.6) 
     
Year=2010 10206.9***   4542.7** 
 (1387.0)   (1599.6) 
     
Year=2011 12154.6***   6676.8*** 
 (1362.9)   (1565.0) 
     
Year=2012 10794.9***   4537.5** 
 (1333.9)   (1577.1) 
     
Year=2013 13346.2***   6615.6*** 
 (1354.9)   (1622.8) 
     
Constant 8926.4*** 19275.3*** 16927.6*** 20830.7*** 
 (1799.4) (794.8) (1554.5) (1842.3) 
Dependent variable Mean day rate  Mean day rate Mean day rate 
Observations 2469 2469 1125 1125 
R-sq. 0.370 0.0500 0.167 0.360 
Standard errors in parentheses 
NOTE: This table shows all estimated coefficients of the baseline model. Year 1995 is omitted because this is 
the reference year.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 10-4 Robustness checks of main results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Day rate 
(USD) 
Day rate 
(USD) 
Day 
rate 
(USD) 
Day rate 
(USD) 
Day rate 
(USD) 
Day rate 
(USD) 
Day rate 
(USD) 
Polity 336.8** -125.6* 117.3 223.8*** 336.8*** 336.8*** 296.2** 
 (120.7) (62.94) (66.71) (67.61) (100.8) (100.8) (102.0) 
        
Latitude in 
degrees 
-95.62***   -
41.98*** 
-
95.62*** 
-
95.62*** 
-93.44*** 
 (17.90)   (9.371) (15.74) (15.74) (15.91) 
        
Oil 
production 
(1000 
barrels/day) 
0.953*    0.953*** 0.953*** 1.120*** 
 (0.412)    (0.266) (0.266) (0.273) 
        
Median 
contract 
duration 
-2.211***    -
2.211*** 
-
2.211*** 
-2.192*** 
 (0.606)    (0.509) (0.509) (0.509) 
        
Crude oil, 
Brent ($/bbl, 
nominal$) 
     145.4***  
      (12.22)  
        
Term 
Utilization 
rate (%) 
      913.9 
       (1500.1) 
Year 
dummies 
included 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard 
Errors 
Clustered Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust 
Observations 2141 3692 3692 3692 2141 2141 2139 
R-sq. 0.0280 0.00101 0.242 0.247 0.370 0.370 0.372 
Standard errors in parentheses 
NOTE: The table shows the regression output for robustness checks of the main model. The reported R-squared 
in model (1) is very low because the year dummies are partialled out. The year dummies are so-called singleton 
dummies, i.e., a variable with one 1 and N-1 zeros or vice versa. By clustering, I request a robust covariance 
matrix.  The singleton dummy causes the robust covariance matrix estimator to be less than full rank. In this case, 
partialling-out the variable with the singleton dummy, here that is the year dummies, solves the problem. The R-
squared of model (1) does not have a practical meaning.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 10-5 Baseline model with region controls 
 Day rate 
(USD) 
Day rate 
(USD) 
Day rate 
(USD) 
Day rate 
(USD) 
Polity 281.8* 478.8** 202.6 296.8* 
 (110.8) (150.4) (145.4) (139.4) 
     
Latitude in degrees -90.76*** -49.33 -54.29 -95.30*** 
 (15.80) (30.69) (43.45) (16.04) 
     
Median contract duration -2.121*** -2.371*** -2.328*** -2.199*** 
 (0.485) (0.511) (0.496) (0.492) 
     
Oil production (1000 
barrels/day) 
1.078*** 0.911** 0.938*** 1.071*** 
 (0.270) (0.291) (0.277) (0.270) 
     
region==Australia/New 
Zealand 
7794.6*    
 (3524.9)    
     
region==Northwest Europe  -4472.4   
  (2664.3)   
     
region==South America   3696.7  
   (3200.4)  
     
region==West Africa    -144.7 
    (2129.9) 
Observations 2469 2469 2469 2469 
R2 0.372 0.373 0.372 0.371 
Standard errors in parentheses 
NOTE: The table shows estimates from the baseline model with region controls added. Year dummies are 
included in the regression, but not reported.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Figure 10-3 Mean day rate on average oil production 
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